

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War, 21 October, 1943 — File No. 22

(1)

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	reports	Situation Reports	10/27/73	B
2	telegram	Amemb Amman to Sec State	10/27/73	B
3	telegram	Amemb Amman to Sec State	10/27/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

1176

FOLDER TITLE

(1)

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #68

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 0600

10/27/
EDT,

Egyptian Third Army

Press and intelligence sources agree that the Egyptian Third Army's October 26 attempts to break out of its encircled positions apparently has failed. Intelligence and IDF sources report the Third's desperation. The IDF believes the Egyptian intent was to resupply the Third from the west bank; the Israelis claim to have destroyed the bridges the Egyptians attempted to build for the resupply effort. The IDF now expects an Egyptian attempt to resupply by helicopter and perhaps an attempt by the Second Army to attack southward in aid of the Third.

Late press reports from Tel Aviv quote the IDF spokesman as claiming that Israeli forces have occupied most of Suez City. The latest press report received, from Reuter's, said that the Suez City area is now quiet, with the Israelis in occupation of most of Suez City after a three to four hour break-out battle with the Egyptian Third.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Zayyat reflected the Third's condition during the October 26 SC meeting when, citing an ICRC report, he accused Israel of preventing an ICRC shipment of humanitarian supplies from reaching the Third Army. A report from USINT Cairo stresses that the Third's plight is becoming the center of Egyptians' attention, and that if the Third is not supplied with food and water soon a complete breakdown of the ceasefire could result.

Peacekeeping

The SC will convene at 10:30 A.M. today for

SECRET/EXDIS
GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

CORRECTED PAGE TWO SITREP #68

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informal consultations on the Secretary General's report on the implementation of UNEF. This should be followed by a formal SC meeting for approval of the report, dependent upon overcoming reportedly strong Chinese and Soviet objections to the proposed financial arrangements. The SC last night authorized the Secretary General to transfer additional forces from Cyprus should he feel such action necessary. It is probable that the British will again furnish the necessary airlift. The composition of UNEF is expected to be under negotiation for sometime following the adoption of the Secretary General's report.

The UNSYG has ordered UNTSO observers forward with all possible speed, and reports from the Middle East verify that UNTSO units are now positioning themselves between the opposing forces on both the Syrian and Suez fronts. The initial UNEF contingents have arrived in Cairo aboard British transports from their former stations on Cyprus. Other reports from the Middle East speculate that the UNEF headquarters will be in Cairo with a tentative composition of two brigades interposed between the hostile forces, one based on the Egyptian side, the other on the Israeli side.

In response to our proposal that certain allies join us in support of the airlift requirements for UNEF, the British have informed us that they are giving urgent consideration to what they can contribute following completion of their airlift of Cyprus based units. The FRG and Canada have also agreed in principle to our proposal. Further responses from our posts regarding availability of forces for UNEF indicate that Australia has informed the SYG that it is prepared to consider a request sympathetically. The Australians probably are thinking in terms of a reinforced battalion, about 1100 men. Finland has in-being a contingent of about 12000 men earmarked for possible UN service. Latin American contributions are potentially a battalion each from Brazil and Paraguay, an infantry company from Uruguay and about ten officers from Nicaragua.

Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania reportedly are offering contingents to UNEF. The PRC has informally indicated its non-participation in any aspect of the force, including financial contributions.

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Israel's Costs and Needs

The following is a UPI report from the UN, based on "Israeli diplomatic sources."

"Israeli diplomatic sources said today Israel lost \$1 billion worth of planes, tanks and other military equipment by the time the UN appealed for an end to the fourth Middle East War.

"Its total losses in military destruction and reduced production amounted to between \$1.5 to \$2 billion, the sources said. The staggering losses were suffered in about 17 days.

"Assessing the present damage, the sources disclosed the first estimates for rebuilding Israel's military machine in the future.

"The sources said that Israel will not be able to accomplish the task of rearming on its own and would count heavily on assistance from the US.

"It will cost between \$2.5 and \$3 billion to replace the losses in the 1973 war and purchase additional armaments to reach the higher level of military power Israel considers necessary for the future, the sources estimated. They said Israel would double its air force to 1,000 planes from the pre-war level of 500, and double the number of its tanks from 2,000 before the outbreak of fighting to a new force of 4,000 tanks. The \$2.5 to \$3 billion, the sources said, would cover only purchases of equipment from abroad over a three-year period. They said Israel could be expected to meet about half its needs with manufacturing at home.

"To make the rearmament possible, the sources said, the US would have to increase its aid from the pre-war level of about \$400 million a year to \$1.5 billion. Considering that the US may balk against such an increase in direct aid, the Israeli sources suggested a "lend-lease" style arrangement, under which US planes, tanks and other armaments could be made available to the Israeli armed forces."

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-4-

US Military Alert

The Joint Chiefs ordered most USMC units in the US to return to DEFCON 5 status effective 0430 EDT October 27.

Tass on US Alert

The following was carried by the Tass English Service at 0643 Moscow time October 27.

"In connection with the events in the ME, reports about the alert of the US armed forces in some areas, including Europe, were made in Washington. Trying to justify this step, officials made reference to some actions of the Soviet Union that allegedly give the grounds for concern. Tass is authorized to state that such explanations are absurd since the actions of the Soviet Union are aimed solely at promoting the implementation of the decisions of the SC on cease-fire and restoration of peace in the ME.

"This step of the US that does not repeat not promote international detente was taken obviously in an attempt to intimidate the Soviet Union. But those who are behind this step should be told that they have chosen the wrong address."

Embassy Moscow commented that the issuance of this statement as an accompaniment to Brezhnev's speech of last night indicates that the Soviets felt the need to make a sharp public response to the U.S. alert but decided that such a response did not fit with the more restrained tone of the Brezhnev speech.

Zambia Breaks with Israel

During the October 26 SC meeting, Zambia announced its decision to break diplomatic relations with Israel.

The Syrian Front

The Syrian Front is reported to be quiet.

APPROVED BY: *[Signature]*

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS



THE JOINT STAFF

TOP SECRET

N M C C

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

27 October 1973
0800 EDT

War

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Recapitulation of Deliveries to Israel

Listed below are data covering US equipment deliveries to Israel as of 0730Z 27 October 1973:

Totals for 24-Hour Periods Ending 0730Z on the Day Shown*	21 Oct	22 Oct	23 Oct	24 Oct
By Soviets	1310-1656	790-984	860-1116	380-528
By U.S. Mil	895	1013	1024	985
By El Al	112	197	54	176

	25 Oct	26 Oct	27 Oct
By Soviets	20-40	340-480	410-564
By U.S. Mil	816	867	858
By El Al	15	212	370**

Cumulative Totals*	21 Oct	22 Oct	23 Oct	24 Oct
By Soviets	8530-10812	8950-11328	9810-12444	10090-12852
By U.S. Mil	4883	5896	6920	7905
By U.S./El Al	1662	1859	1913	2089

	25 Oct	26 Oct	27 Oct
By Soviets	10110-12876	10450-13356	10860-13920
By U.S. Mil	8721	9588	10446
By U.S./El Al	2104	2316	2686**

*Excluding aircraft delivered.

**Includes reconciliation of previously unreported tonnages.

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U.S. Aircraft Delivered

<u>No.</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Date Delivered</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
8	F-4E	14 Oct 73	
6	F-4E	15 Oct 73	
12	C-130B	15 Oct 73	
12	F-4E	17 Oct 73	
2	F-4E	18 Oct 73	
4	F-4E	20 Oct 73	
8	A-4	21 Oct 73	
10	A-4	22 Oct 73	
7	F-4	22 Oct 73	
1	F-4	23 Oct 73	Completes programmed F-4 delivery.
13	A-4	23 Oct 73	
5	A-4	24 Oct 73	Two other A-4s are scheduled for air deployment. Four A-4s in transit by ship; 12 A-4s in preparation for transit by ship at Norfolk.

Sorties

	<u>Last 24 Hours</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
C-141	16	201
C-5	5	66
E1 A1	4	67

Charles K. Heiden

CHARLES K. HEIDEN
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for
Operations, NMCC

Distribution:
CJCS
DJS
MIL ASST TO SECDEF
J-30
J-31
J-32
J-33
J-36
J-37
J-4
DDO, NMCC
ADDO, NMCC

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Oct 27, 1973

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, US
SUBJ: US - ISRAEL RELATIONS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. YOU SHOULD KNOW BEFORE YOUR 1700 MEETING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH GOI IN WASHINGTON. THESE HAVE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY CONCERNED POSITION OF EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY ON EAST BANK OF SUEZ.

2. AS A RESULT OF EXCHANGE WHICH WE WERE ABLE TO FACILITATE HERE IN WASHINGTON BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, ABOUT WHICH USSR HAS BEEN KEPT VERY GENERALLY INFORMED, THE FOLLOWING HAS TAKEN PLACE:

3. BOTH ISRAEL AND EGYPT INDICATE THEY ARE PREPARED TO HAVE A MEETING BETWEEN GENERAL OFFICERS AT 1500 HRS CAIRO/TEL AVIV TIME OCTOBER 27 TO DISCUSS MILITARY ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC RES'S 338 AND 339. THE MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE UNDER UN SUPERVISION AND ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE BY UNTSO AND ACTING UNEF COMMANDER MAJOR GENERAL SIILVASUO. IN ADDITION EGYPT HAS PROPOSED AND ISRAEL SEEMS PREPARED TO AGREE TO PERMIT CONVOY CARRYING NON MILITARY SUPPLIES FOR SUEZ AND THIRD ARMY EAST OF CANAL TO PASS TO ITS DESTINATION BY 1500 LOCAL TIME UNDER UN AND RED CROSS SUPERVISION. KISSINGER

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10/27/73 10/27/73
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10/27

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ACTION 10-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 NEA-10 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00
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L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20
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AMCONGEN JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

UNCLAS USUN 4270

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR UN SC XF
SUBJ: ME IN SC: AMBASSADOR SCALI'S EXPLANATION
OF VOTE ON RES 341.

REF: USUN 4268

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMB. SCALI
OCTOBER 27 IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON SC RES. 341:

STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMB. JOHN SCALI, IN EXPLANATION

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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OF VOTE ON SYG'S REPORT TO THE SC CONTAINED IN S/11052-REV 1

QUOTE

MR. PRESIDENT

THE UNITED STATES WELCOMES WITH GREAT SATISFACTION THE ACTION OF THE COUNCIL IN APPROVING THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT. WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED INDDED THAT THIS ORGAN CAN ACT EFFECTIVELY TO FULFILL ITS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INT'L PEACE AND SECURITY.

EVEN AS WE REJOICE IN OUR AGREEMENT IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULT TASK CONFRONTING THE EMERGENCY FORCE. SUPERVISING CEASE FIRE LINES IN THE AREA IN THE WAKE OF WAR WILL NOT BE EASY. THE FORCE FROM ITS INCEPTION WILL REQUIRE THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED--AS THE SECRETARY'S REPORT STATES. FINALLY IT MUST OPERATE AS AN INTEGRATED AND MILITARY UNIT WITH SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FOR NONE.

WE CONSIDER THE LANGUAGE OF THE REPORT CAREFULLY DRAWN. FOR INSTANCE THE STATEMENT, "ALL MATTERS WHICH MAY AFFECT THE NATURE OR THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE FORCE WILL BE REFERRED TO THE COUNCIL FOR DECISION" ASSURES AN ORDERLY, AGREED WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCE, BUT ONLY WHEN THE COUNCIL SO DECIDES. WE ARE ALSO SATISFIED THAT THE PHRASE "BEARING IN MIND THE ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF EQUITABLE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION" IS CONSISTENT WITH ART 101 OF THE CHARTER AND ASSURES THAT ALL THE OTHER OBVIOUS AND NECESSARY CRITERIA WILL BE GIVEN APPROPRIATE CONSIDERATION IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, WE HOPE THAT THE SEC-GEN CAN MOVE AS SWIFTLY AS POSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION WE HAVE JUST APPROVED. THE UNITED STATES, AS I SAID IN MY STATEMENT OF OCT 25, IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE TO THIS END.

FINALLY, MR. PRESIDENT, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY PERSONAL SATISFACTION THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAS HELPED TO ARRANGE FOR A MEETING ON THE GROUND OF EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI MILITARY REPS UNDER UN AUSPICES TO DISCUSS THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE. THIS IS A SIGNIFICANT PRACTICAL RESULT OF THE THOROUGH DELIVERATIONS IN THIS CHAMBER. I REGARD IT AS ESPECIALLY NOTE-WORTHY THAT ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOW BEING MADE TO PROVIDE NON-MILITARY SUPPLIES FOR THE THIRD ARMY AREA. FOR US THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECT OF THE UN EFFORT IS A CRITICALLY IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THIS PEACEKEEPING MISSION.

MR. PRESIDENT, MAY I ONCE AGAIN EXPRESS MY DELEGATIONS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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FIRM SUPPORT FOR THIS CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION OF THE COUNCIL. THE
FUTURE WILL RECORD THIS AS AN HISTORIC MOMENT IN THE ANNALS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS IF WE CAN MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM
GENERATED HERE AND MOVE ON TO A PEACEFUL DURABLE SETTLEMENT.
SCALI

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Department of State

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RECD 27 OCT 73

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HAK laugh with FRG

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, GW, IS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FRG AMBASSADOR VON STADEN,
OCTOBER 26

1. FRG AMBASSADOR VON STADEN EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE FOR BEING RECEIVED BY THE SECRETARY, AND AFTER A BRIEF EXCHANGE (ALL COVERED IN SEPTTEL) CONCERNING FRG FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW, SOVIET OBSERVERS IN EGYPT, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF FRG TRANSPORTING UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE PERSONNEL TO THE MIDDLE EAST (THE GERMAN CABINET HAD AGREED TO DO SO), THE DISCUSSION TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF THE FRG'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE MILITARY RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL FROM US STOCKS IN GERMANY.
2. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WAS ASTONISHED AT THE POSITION THE FRG HAD TAKEN ON THIS MATTER. WE HAVE NO INTEREST IN A PRO-ISRAELI POLICY PER SE. ONCE THE CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN FULLY ESTABLISHED, WE INTEND TO PROMOTE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AND IN THE PROCESS WE WILL TAKE POSITIONS WHICH WILL NOT BE FULLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS.
3. WHAT HAS BEEN AT ISSUE IN THE NEAR EAST FOR THE PAST TWO WEEKS, HE SAID, IS THE POSSIBILITY OF A VICTORY BY THOSE AIDED BY THE SOVIETS. IF THESE FORCES HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO WIN, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A RADICALIZATION OF THE ENTIRE AREA AND A SETBACK FOR THE WEST.
4. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT, GIVEN THE LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THIS POINT WHICH OUR ALLIES HAVE SHOWN, WE ARE ASKING OURSELVES FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR ALLIES. HE NOTED THAT WHEN HE HAD SPOKEN PUBLICLY OF EUROPE HAVING ONLY A REGIONAL INTEREST, HE WAS ATTACKED BY HIS EUROPEAN



Department of State

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COLLEAGUES. NOW WHEN SOMETHING HAPPENS IN AN AREA OF INTEREST TO EUROPE, EUROPEANS DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES COMPLETELY. ALL WE ASKED FOR IS UNDERSTANDING IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, BUT WE HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY ISOLATED. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HOPED THE AMBASSADOR WOULD REPORT THAT THE SECRETARY IS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT, WHO IS PREPARED TO ADDRESS HIMSELF ON THIS POINT DIRECTLY TO THE CHANCELLOR.

5. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT WHAT WAS AT ISSUE WAS NOT THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI SHIPS OR INDIVIDUAL ARMS SHIPMENTS. WE THINK OUR ACTIONS IN THE NEAR EAST ARE IN DEFENSE OF WESTERN INTERESTS GENERALLY. DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF THE WAR, OUR OBJECTIVE WAS TO INSURE THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOT DEFEATED, OUR OBJECTIVE THE SECOND WEEK WAS TO PREVENT FURTHER SOVIET INTRUSION IN THE AREA.

6. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE EUROPEANS ARE MORE DEPENDENT UPON ARAB OIL THAN WE, BUT WE DISAGREE THAT YOUR VULNERABILITY IS DECREASED BY DISASSOCIATING YOURSELVES FROM US ON A MATTER OF THIS IMPORTANCE. SUCH DISASSOCIATION WILL NOT HELP THE EUROPEANS IN THE ARAB WORLD. THE ARABS KNOW THAT ONLY THE US CAN PROVIDE THE HELP TO GET A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. NOT ONLY WILL EUROPEAN CAPITULATION TO THE ARABS NOT RESULT IN THEIR INSURING THEIR OIL SUPPLY, BUT IT CAN HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION WHO, IF ALLOWED TO SUCCEED IN THE NEAR EAST, CAN BE EXPECTED TO MOUNT EVER MORE AGGRESSIVE POLICIES ELSEWHERE. TO DEGREE SOVIET INFLUENCE CAN BE REDUCED, WE WILL GAIN A LONG TERM ADVANTAGE EVEN IF WE PAY A SHORT TERM PRICE.

7. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WISHED TO TELL AMBASSADOR VON STADEN HONESTLY THAT THE US TAKES A DIM VIEW OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED, AND HE HOPED THAT THE AMBASSADOR WOULD CONVEY HIS VIEWS CONFIDENTIALLY TO HIS AUTHORITIES IN BONN. WE HAD NO WISH OF HAVING THIS MATTER DISCUSSED FURTHER IN THE PRESS.

8. AMBASSADOR VON STADEN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF THE FRANKNESS WITH WHICH THE SECRETARY HAD SPOKEN. HE SAID THE SECRETARY HAD DONE MUCH TO CLARIFY THE US POSITION. VON STADEN SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO REPEAT THE ARGUMENTS THAT HAD GONE BACK AND FORTH IN BONN BETWEEN AMBASSADOR



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HILLENBRAND AND FRG OFFICIALS. HE WISHED TO RECALL, HOWEVER, THAT FOLLOWING THE FIRST CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND AND FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL, THE FRG HAD SHOWN GREAT UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED TO REESTABLISH A MILITARY BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN THIS OBJECTIVE PRIORITY OVER ALL OTHER QUESTIONS. THE FRG COOPERATED WITH US, AND KEPT SILENT FOR MANY DAYS. THIS RESUPPLY EFFORT DID NOT, HOWEVER, GO UNNOTICED. ARAB PRESSURE BEGAN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, AND GREW EVER MORE INTENSE. THE FRG DID NOT BOW TO SUCH PRESSURE, AND MADE NO MOVE TO INTERFERE WITH THE RESUPPLY EFFORT. IT WAS ONLY AFTER THE CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN ACHIEVED THAT STATE SECRETARY FRANK SAW AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND AND ASKED THAT THE OPERATION END. A REPORT OF THE FRANK-HILLENBRAND CONVERSATION WAS THEN PASSED TO THE EGYPTIANS IN CAIRO. THE NEXT DAY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT LEARNED THROUGH A NORTH GERMAN NEWSPAPER THAT ISRAELI SHIPS WERE INVOLVED IN THE RESUPPLY EFFORT. THIS PUT THE FRG IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. IT WAS ONE THING IF ARMS WERE TRANSPORTED BY THE US. WHO COULD SAY TO WHAT DESTINATION US PLANES AND SHIPS WERE BOUND? THERE COULD, HOWEVER, BE ONLY ONE INTERPRETATION IF THE VESSELS OF ONE OF THE BELLIGERENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT WERE MOVING ARMS FROM FRG PORTS. WHAT WAS AT STAKE WAS THE CREDIBILITY OF THE FRG POSITION AND, IN THIS SITUATION, THE FRG COULD NOT REMAIN SILENT. EVEN THEN THE FRG SOUGHT TO PREVENT PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE ARMS RESUPPLY EFFORT AND SIDESTEP THE BARRAGE OF QUESTIONS IT WAS RECEIVING. THE FRG IN THE END ISSUED NO PRESS STATEMENT, BUT MERELY DIRECTED ITS PRESS SPOKESMAN TO ANSWER QUESTIONS. THIS PRESS PLAY WAS REGRETTABLE, BUT CLEARLY UNAVOIDABLE.

9. VON STADEN SAID WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO EXPLAIN WAS THAT THE FRG SHOWED AS MUCH SOLIDARITY AS IT COULD. IT HAD DISPLAYED THIS SOLIDARITY IN NATO AS WELL. IT HAD SPOKEN OUT ONLY WHEN IT'S CREDITIBILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD WAS AT

STAKE. VON STADEN RECALLED THAT IT TOOK THE FRG SOME 7 YEARS AFTER 1965 TO REESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD. VON STADEN REITERATED THAT BONN HAD ALWAYS ASSUMED THE RESUPPLY EFFORT WOULD END WITH THE CEASEFIRE.

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10. THE FRG DOES NOT WANT THIS MATTER TO BECOME AN ALLIANCE ISSUE, BUT HOPED IT CAN BE KEPT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PRESENT NEAR EAST CRISIS. VON STADEN SAID THAT, SPEAKING ON A PERSONAL BASIS, HE VERY MUCH REGRETTED THE REMARKS TODAY BY DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER AND AMBASSADOR MCCLOSKEY, PRECISELY BECAUSE THEY HAD LINKED THE NEAR EAST ISSUE TO BROADER ALLIANCE QUESTIONS. IT WAS VON STADEN'S WISH THAT THESE MATTERS BE KEPT SEPARATE.

11. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS NOT AWARE OF WHAT SCHLESINGER HAD SAID, BUT AFTER GLANCING OVER NOTES OF MCCLOSKEY'S REMARKS, INDICATED THAT THEY DID IN FACT REFLECT US VIEWS. IT WAS TRUE THAT EACH ISSUE THAT HAD ARISEN WITH THE FRG OR OUR OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES IS NOT AN ALLIANCE ISSUE IN ITSELF. IT IS THE OVERALL POSITION OF OUR ALLIES THAT RAISES THE MOST SERIOUS QUESTIONS. TIME AND TIME AGAIN WE HAVE OFFERED TO CONSULT AND WORK OUT COMMON POSITIONS. WHAT WE RECEIVE IS THE CONSPICUOUS DISASSOCIATION OF OUR ALLIES. WE THINK WE ARE ENGAGED IN AN EXERCISE TO DEFEND OUR COMMON INTERESTS. WHAT WE HAVE IN THE PRESENT INSTANCE IS TWO WEEKS OF INTENSE CRISIS IN WHICH WE SOUGHT TO DISCOURAGE SOVIET ADVENTURISM. THESE ARE THE FACTS HOWEVER ONE VIEWS THE MERITS OF ISRAELI POLICY NOW AND OVER THE PAST SIX YEARS. ONCE THE WAR STARTED, IT WAS IN NO ONE'S INTERESTS TO SEE THE ISRAELIS DEFEATED. WE MOVED CONSCIOUSLY TO END THE WAR AT A TIME WHEN THE ISRAELIS WERE WINNING, THUS INCREASING THE LIKELIHOOD OF MOVING LATER TO SOME FORM OF ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

12. THE SECRETARY REPEATED THAT THE SHIPS WERE THEMSELVES NOT AN ALLIANCE ISSUE, BUT THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE ADOPTED IS AN ISSUE. IT IS ONE THAT PROFOUNDLY CONCERNS US. IT HAS HAPPENED WITH TOO MUCH CONSISTENCY, TOO MANY TIMES. THE SECRETARY SAID THE AMBASSADOR MIGHT DEEM HIM ARROGANT, BUT HE ASKED THAT VON STADEN UNDERSTAND THE BACKGROUND FROM WHICH HE SPOKE, AS ONE WHO HAS LONG FAVORED EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.

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13. AMBASSADOR VON STADEN SAID HE APPRECIATED THE FRANKNESS WITH WHICH THE SECRETARY SPOKE. HE NOTED THAT MCCLOSKEY HAD SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED GERMANY AND SINCE THE SECRETARY'S SCHEDULE WAS PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE POSSIBILITY EXISTED THAT HE WOULD PERHAPS BE ASKED QUESTIONS ON HIS WAY OUT OR LATER AS TO THE CONTENT OF HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY. IT WOULD BE USEFUL THEREFORE TO AGREE ON WHAT WE BOTH MIGHT SAY.

14. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT VON STADEN SAY MERELY THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD REQUESTED THIS MEETING SOME TIME AGO FOR A GENERAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. THE REVIEW TODAY HAD ALSO DEALT, AT SOME LENGTH, WITH THE GENERAL ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP. HE ALSO SAID THE AMBASSADOR COULD ADD THAT IT HAD BEEN A USEFUL AND FRIENDLY TALK.

15. VON STADEN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION, AND SAID HE WOULD ADHERE TO THIS LINE WITH THE PRESS.

16. THE SECRETARY SAID HE ANTICIPATED NO QUESTIONS ON OUR SIDE, BUT DID WISH TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE FRG AMBASSADOR UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WERE TWO SEPARATE THINGS IN QUESTION. WE DID NOT LIKE WHAT HAD HAPPENED WITH RESPECT TO THE SHIPMENTS. WE WOULD NOT HOWEVER HAVE CALLED IN THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE ALONE, AND INDEED HAD NOT DONE SO. NONETHELESS THIS QUESTION MAY ESCALATE TO THE PRESIDENT WHO MAY WISH TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE CHANCELLOR.

17. WHAT WE REALLY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT IS THE TOTAL PATTERN OF EUROPEAN BEHAVIOR, WHICH IN THE LONG TERM HAS DISASTROUS POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ALLIANCE.

18. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THERE WAS A SERIOUS PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION WHICH HAD DEVELOPED IN THE LAST 14 DAYS.

19. THE SECRETARY SAID HE RECOGNIZED THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM. HE HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT AS NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST DEVELOP, A

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MEANS SHOULD BE FOUND TO INFORM OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES MORE SWIFTLY AND COMPLETELY. THERE WAS A PROBLEM HERE, HOWEVER. IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE ALLIES TO INSIST ON A RIGHT TO PRIVATE BRIEFINGS WHEN THEIR FUNDAMENTAL ATTITUDE WAS EITHER SLIGHTLY OR OPENLY HOSTILE.

20. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR INSISTED THAT IF INFORMATION WERE PROVIDED MORE PROMPTLY THE POLICY ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN ALLIES WAS LESS LIKELY TO BE DIVERGENT. THE SECRETARY SAID THIS WAS PERHAPS SO, UNLESS OUR UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHIES WERE DIVERGENT.

21. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE TRADITIONAL GERMAN SPIRIT HAD A STRONG PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENT, THE PRESENT FRG GOVERNMENT SOUGHT TO BE PRAGMATIC. HE WISHED AGAIN TO NOTE THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO PROBLEM WITH THE RESUPPLY EFFORT AT THE START. THE ONLY DIFFICULTY OCCURRED AFTER THE CEASE FIRE. MOREOVER, THE FIRST PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE FRG CAME AFTER THE PRESS HAD OBTAINED KNOWLEDGE ON ITS OWN OF THE PRESENCE OF ISRAEL SHIPS IN FRG WATERS. THE REAL PROBLEM THE FRG AMBASSADOR INSISTED, WAS THE SERIOUS LACK OF COORDINATION AND CONSULTATION BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE.

22. THE SECRETARY THEN RAISED

THE QUESTION OF THE EC/US DECLARATION. HE SAID THAT HE HAS BEGUN TO BE BORED BY THIS PROJECT AND WAS NOT SURE IT WAS WORTH FURTHER CONSULTATIONS. IN ITS PRESENT SHAPE IT COULD NOT SURVIVE FIVE LET ALONE FIFTY YEARS. IT WAS IRONIC THAT THE EUROPEANS REFUSED TO ACCEPT WORDS SUCH AS "PARTNERSHIP" AND "CONSULTATIONS." HE TOO COULD BE PRAGMATIC AND WAS AWARE THAT IT DID NOT MATTER WHAT WORD WE USED IN DRAFTING A DECLARATION, BUT THE QUARREL WAS SYMPTOMATIC OF WHAT WAS GOING ON. HE WISHED TO RECALL THAT THE PROJECT FOR A DECLARATION HAD BEGUN ON OUR INITIATIVE. WE STAND TO GET NOTHING FROM THE EFFORT BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CLOSER COOPERATION.

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23. THE FRG AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WAS TORN BETWEEN TWO LOYALTIES IN REPLYING. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER TO SPEAK IN THE SINGULAR OR IN THE PLURAL WHEN DISCUSSING EUROPEANS. HE ONLY WISHED TO SAY AGAIN THAT HE PERSONALLY IS WITH US ON THESE ISSUES AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO DO ITS BEST. SOMETIMES THE RESULTS WOULD BE EMBARRASSING TO US; SOMETIMES TOO IT WAS EMBARRASSING AND DIFFICULT FOR THE FRG. THE OBJECTIVE TO WHICH HE CONTINUED TO BE DEDICATED WAS THE DESIRE TO BUILD A UNITED EUROPE.

24. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE TOO STRONGLY FAVOR THIS COURSE. WE WISHED TO HELP PROMOTE EUROPEAN UNITY. IT WOULD BE IRONIC NOW IF THE FATHERS OF EUROPEAN UNITY IN THE US COULD SEE THE UNITED EUROPE THEY SUPPORTED REFUSING TO USE THE WORD "PARTNERSHIP", OR SEE THAT UNITY DEVELOPING IN OPPOSITION TO THE US, OR THAT UNITY MAKING COOPERATION WITH US MORE RATHER THAN LESS DIFFICULT. THIS TOO WAS ONE OF THE FACTS THAT MAY HAVE A PROFOUND EFFECT ON OUR LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP. AS A HISTORIAN, THE SECRETARY SAID HE SIMPLY DID NOT KNOW HOW THE WEST COULD MAKE IT. IT WAS CLAIMING VICTORIES WHERE THERE WERE NO BATTLES. WE ARE BLEEDING OURSELVES SLOW AND UNSPECTACULARLY. HE SAID HE WAS OFTEN STRUCK BY A PROFOUND SADNESS. IN SOME OF THIS, HE THOUGHT FRG FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL SHARED HIS ASSESSMENT.

25. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT IT HAD TAKEN YEARS FOR THE UK TO JOIN EUROPE AND THAT MUCH OF THE DIALOGUE NOW PRESENT BETWEEN THE US AND THE EUROPEANS IS REMINISCENT OF THE DISCUSSIONS THAT TOOK PLACE IN EARLIER DAYS WITH THE UK. PERHAPS THE PROBLEM WOULD BE SOLVED IF ONE ONLY HAS PATIENCE.

26. THE SECRETARY SAID THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT WHEN THE EUROPEANS OVERCOME THEIR DIFFICULTIES WE MAY NO LONGER BE IN A POSITION TO RESPOND. IF ONE LOOKS AT THE FUTURE OF THE US GOVERNMENT, ONE IS IMPRESSED WITH THE FACT THAT THIS IS THE LAST ADMINISTRATION WHICH HAS AN EMOTIONAL COMMITMENT TO EUROPE. FUTURE ADMINISTRATIONS MAY HAVE

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SOME INTELLECTUAL COMMITMENT, BUT THIS MAY NOT BE GOOD ENOUGH. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO POINT TO ANYTHING POSITIVE IN THE ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP IN THE LAST FEW YEARS. WHAT OF A POSITIVE NATURE COULD ONE SHOW? THE EMOTIONAL ASPECT OF POLICY IS NOW IN INTEREST IN TRIPS TO PEKING AND MOSCOW. THIS IS ALL WE CAN POINT TO. THIS CAN KILL US IN THE END.

27. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THERE WAS STILL A CHANCE FOR SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE US/EC DECLARATION DURING THE NEXT MEETING IN NOVEMBER.

28. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY SAYING HE HAD SPOKEN WITH PROFOUND SINCERITY. HE SAID MANY THINGS COULD BE FAKED. WE COULD GET BY WITH A DECLARATION WITH LITTLE CONTENT AND BE ASSURED IT GOT GOOD TREATMENT IN THE PRESS. BUT WE DO NOT WANT A FAKE PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION. WE WANT THE REAL THING. KISSINGER
BT


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S E C R E T STATE 212588

NODIS

E.O. 11652 - XGDS
TAGS: PBOR, XX
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI CEASEFIRE SITUATION

1. SITUATION WITH REGARD TO SUPPLIES FOR EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY ON SOUTHERN SUEZ FRONT, WHICH ENCIRCLED AND CUT OFF BY ISRAELIS, HAS POSED PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO STABILIZING CEASEFIRE CALLED FOR IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 OF OCTOBER 22 AND REAFFIRMED IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 339. WE HAVE HAD INTENSIVE EXCHANGES, INCLUDING THROUGHOUT LAST NIGHT, WITH EGYPTIANS, ISRAELIS AND SOVIETS REGARDING QUESTION OF NON-MILITARY SUPPLY (FOOD, WATER, MEDICAL SUPPLIES) OF THIRD ARMY.
2. AS RESULT OF OUR EFFORTS, ISRAELIS HAVE OFFERED TO SEND SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TO MEET WITH EGYPTIAN-COUNTERPART WITH VIEW TO WORKING OUT DETAILS ON HOW MILITARY PARTS OF RESOLUTIONS 338 AND 339 CAN BE WORKED OUT.
3. AS PART OF ABOVE, ISRAELIS HAVE INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ALLOW ONE CONVOY OF NON-MILITARY SUPPLIES THROUGH TO THIRD ARMY UNDER UN AND RED CROSS AUSPICES.
4. EGYPT HAS AGREED TO FOREGOING PROPOSAL, AND MEETING

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OF MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES NOW SCHEDULED FOR MIDNIGHT
CAIRO TIME TODAY, OCTOBER 27.

5. FOR US MISSION NATO: AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD SHOULD
BRIEF NAC ON FOREGOING.

6. FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN POSTS: YOU SHOULD ALSO BRIEF
GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. IN ADDITION,
WE ARE BRIEFING FRENCH, BRITISH, JAPANESE AND GERMANS
HERE.

7. OTHER ADDRESSEES ARE AUTHORIZED TO DRAW ON
FOREGOING IN RESPONSE TO QUERIES FROM HOST GOVERNMENTS.

KISSINGER

BT

#2588

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APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY

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11/27/73

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
E.O. 11652 - GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR THE KING

REF: AMMAN 5726

YOU MAY TELL THE KING THAT THE ISRAELIS-ACCEPT HIS
WORD IN GOOD FAITH REGARDING THE MOVEMENT OF JORDANIAN
ARMORED UNITS TO THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST OF JORDAN. KISSINGER
BT
#2617

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10/27/73 EXT 29380
APPROVED BY: NEA ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR.
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War
TELEGRAM

27 Oct

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PAGE 01 USUN N 04260 270704Z

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ACTION SS-30

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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 4260

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR UNSC XF
SUBJ: USSR AND US IN ME: UNEF AND UNTSO

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ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORNATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
O'NEIL _____
RATLIF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELD _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

SUMMARY. ACCOMPANIED BY AMB SCHAUFLE AND POLCOUNS, I MET WITH AMB MALIK, AMB SAFRONCHUK AND OVINNIKOV AFTER SC MEETING NIGHT OF OCT 26. MALIK FROM OUTSET TOOK AGGRESSIVE TONE AND SEEMED TO MAKE POINT OF MIXING CONSIDERATION OF UNTSO AND UNEF MATTERS TO EMPHASIZE DGREEE TO WHICH SOVS REGARD THEM AS ASPECTS OF SINGLE QUESTION. NO FINAL UNDERSTANDINGS WERE REACHED ON COMPOSITION OF EITHER UNEF OR UNTSO. END SUMMARY.

1. MALIK REFERRED BROADLY TO PRES NIXON'S PRESS CONFERENCE. REFERENCES TODAY TO US WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN UNTSO. HE PROFESSED TO INTERPRET PRESIDENT'S POSITION AS RESPONSIVE TO SOV DISPATCH OF 70 OBSERVERS TO CAIRO. I DREW HIM UP SHORT ON THIS. I SAID WE WERE PREPARED TO SEE A SMALLER NUMBER OF SOVS (TO BE MATCHED BY EQUAL NUMBER OF AMERICANS) COMPLETELY INTEGRATED INTO UNTSO, WITHOUT ANY SPECIAL RIGHTS OR DISTINCTIONS. MALIK IMMEDIATELY RAISED ISSUE OF BALANCE, ASSERTING THAT MORE THAN HALF OF UNTSO PERSONNEL COMES FROM NATO COUNTRIES. I TOLD MALIK THAT OVERALL BALANCE WAS SYG'S PROBLEM AND SUGGESTED WE TALK ABOUT BALANCING USSR AND US ELEMENTS. MALIK ASKED WHAT "SMALLER" NUMBERS OF US AND SOV PERSONNEL WE WERE THINKING OF FOR UNTSO. I SAID 15 OR 20.

2. MALIK REACTED STRONGLY, SHOUTING "NOT FAIR, NOT FAIR!"

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HE REFERRED AGAIN TO NATO TILT OF PRESENT UNTSO MEMBERSHIP AND BEGAN REPEATING THEM US HAD ALWAYS DOMINATED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN FIRST 28 YEARS OF UN. AS "COM-PROMISE", MALIK SUGGESTED THAT A FAIR ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD TEND TO BALANCE UNTSO WOULD BE TO AUGMENT IT WITH 40 AMERICANS, 40 SOVIETS, 10 BYELORUSSIANS AND 10 UKRAINIANS.

3. I COUNTERED BY SUGGESTING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF NO MAJOR POWER PARTICIPATION, AS DEFINED IN SC RES 340, BE APPLIED TO UNTSO. MALIK AGAIN CRIED FOUL, REFERRING TO "ALL THOSE NATO TYPES" IN UNTSO. HE WENT ON TO EXPRESS INDIGNATION THAT US HAD "TWICE SPOKEN TO WALDHEIM" AGAINST PARTICIPATION OF A POLISH CONTINGENT IN UNEF. HIS RHETORIC MOVED BACKWARD ABOUT 10 YEARS AS HE DECRIED US "PRESSURE" AND "DICTATION" TO SYG. MALIK'S VOICE ROSE ANOTHER OCTAVE AS HE DENOUNCED MRS. MEIR'S "ARROGANT AND UNJUSTIFIABLE" ASSERTION THAT SHE WOULD ACCEPT NO COMMUNISTS AND NO REPRESENTATIVES OF COUNTRIES NOT HAVING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL IN UNEF UNITS ON ISRAELI SIDE OF CEASEFIRE LINES. WHAT RIGHT DOES SHE HAVE, MALIK ASKED, ESPECIALLY WHEN SHE IS NOT EVEN TALKING ABOUT ISRAELI TERRITORY.

4. I ASKED WHICH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES MALIK WOULD SUGGEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN UNEF. MALIK REPLIED THAT POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND BULGARIA HAVE VOLUNTEERED. I ASKED WHAT MALIK THOUGHT OF THE IDEA OF HAVING NEITHER WARSAW PACT NOR NATO COUNTRIES REPRESENTED IN UNEF. MALIK PRODUCED WHAT PURPORTED TO BE INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW AND READ ALOUD LANGUAGE TO EFFECT THAT US REWRITE OF OP PARA THREE OF SC RES 340 WAS PART OF US EFFORT TO INTRODUCE ANTI-SOCIALIST BIAS INTO UNEF. FOR 28 YEARS US HAD BEEN MASTERS OF ALL UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. THIS WAS NOT JUST. OUR PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WAS CONTRARY TO SC RES 340. SOVS HAD AGREED TO 340 TO AVOID DEBATE. MALIK CLAIMED HE HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN TEMPTED TO VETO OUR AMENDMENT TO PARA THREE BUT HAD RECOMMENDED TO MOSCOW THAT SOVS VOTE "YES" TO AVOID CONFRONTATION WITH US. MOSCOW HAD AGREED. MALIK ASKED HOW MANY COUNTRIES SYG WOULD INVITE TO PARTICIPATE IN UNEF. WITHOUT WAITING FOR AN ANSWER, HE DECLARED THAT HIS SIDE HAD CONCEDED ON RES 340 AND IT WAS NOW US TURN TO MAKE CONCESSION.

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5. I TRIED AT THIS POINT TO INVOKE IMPLICITLY A LITTLE OF THE DETENTE SPIRIT. I ASSERTED THAT WE HAD MET TONIGHT FOR A FRIENDLY DISCUSSION PRECISELY IN ORDER TO AVOID CONFRONTATION LATER. PAST PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS NOT ALWAYS HAVING BEEN SUCCESSFUL, WE WANTED TO REMOVE ANY ELEMENTS THAT COULD CAUSE CONFRONTATION OR ENMITY BETWEEN US AND USSR BECAUSE WE WANT THIS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION TO WORK. I SUGGESTED WE LOOK AT PRESENT PROBLEMS ON THEIR OWN MERITS AND NOT REGARD QUESTION OF WHO HAD MADE MOST RECENT CONCESSIONS AS SUBSTANTIVELY RELEVANT. I SAID I THOUGHT MAJORITY OF UN MEMBERSHIP WOULD BE HAPPY TO EXCLUDE BOTH WARSAW PACT AND NATO COUNTRY PARTICIPATION IN UNEF.

6. I WENT ON TO SUGGEST A COMPROMISE ON THE NATO-WARSAW PACT BALANCE. WHAT ABOUT NORWAY AND ROMANIA? MALIK AGAIN RAISED HIS VOICE. I WAS TRYING TO DICTATE, WAS MYSELF REPRESENTING DICTATE OF MRS. MEIR, WAS TRYING TO CHOOSE BOTH NATO AND WARSAW PACT REPRESENTATION. US HAS MORE INFLUENCE ON SYG THAN SOVS. "YOU SAY YOU SEEK PEACE AND MAKE INCREDIBLE CLAIM THAT INCLUSION OF POLAND IN UNEF NOT GOOD FOR PEACE!" HE AGAIN ALLUDED TO FACT WE HAD COMMUNICATED TO SYG (RE POLAND) WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH SOV MISSION. I TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO NOTE, FIRMLY BUT WITHOUT SHOW OF HEAT, THAT SOVS HAD SENT THEIR SO-CALLED PEACE OBSERVERS TO CAIRO WITHOUT CONSULTING US OR INDEED ANY MEMBER OF SC OR SYG. AT THIS POINT I SUGGESTED WE MIGHT DO WELL TO SLEEP ON OUR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.

7. COMMENT: MALIK WAS IN MOOD FOR TOUGH BARGAINING AND WAS PROBABLY BOTH FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS AND REFLECTING HIS OWN FEELINGS. I THINK WE SHOULD STAND FIRM ON OUR PROPOSAL THAT UNTSO RECEIVE ONLY 15 OR 20 SOVS AND AN EQUAL NUMBER OF AMERICANS. THEY MAY GIVE ON THIS ONE. I AM LESS CERTAIN ABOUT UNEF.
SCALI

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: MOPS, JO, SY
SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO KING HUSSEIN

REF: (A) AMMAN 5708. (B) AMMAN 5726

1. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO CONVEY ORALLY FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM SECRETARY TO KING HUSSEIN IN RESPONSE TO KING'S
MESSAGES CONTAINED REFTELS:

2. QTE YOUR MAJESTY:

I APPRECIATE VERY MUCH RECEIVING YOUR LAST TWO
MESSAGES CONCERNING THE STATUS OF THE JORDAN ARMY UNITS
PRESENTLY IN SYRIA AND THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
IRAQI MILITARY PRESENCE IN SYRIA. THE SITUATION IN SYRIA
IS, INDEED, DELICATE AND PRESIDENT ASAD'S ABILITY TO
MAINTAIN CONTROL OF BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEVELOP-
MENTS IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE. ACCORDINGLY, I AGREE
FULLY WITH YOUR WISE SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION TO
RESPOND AFFIRMATIVELY TO PRESIDENT ASAD'S REQUEST THAT
THE WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR FORCES IN SYRIA SHOULD BE GRADUAL
AND PHASED TO HIS ABILITY TO REPLACE IN THE NEAR FUTURE
JORDANIAN UNITS WITH THOSE OF SYRIA.

I ALSO AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR CONFIDENCE IN
INFORMING ME OF THE PRECAUTIONARY MOVE YOU HAVE TAKEN

AGAINST ANY POSSIBLE AND UNUSUAL IRAQI MILITARY ACTIONS.
IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING, WE
HAVE INFORMED THE ISRAELIS, AT YOUR REQUEST, OF YOUR
MOTIVES FOR MOVING YOUR ARMORED UNITS TO THE NORTH AND
NORTHEAST OF JORDAN.

SECRET



Department of State

-2- STATE 212589

I WISH TO EXPRESS MY ADMIRATION FOR THE
ESSENTIAL ROLE YOU ARE PLAYING IN INFLUENCING PRESIDENT
ASAD TO ADOPT POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE POLICIES WHICH
CAN ONLY ENHANCE ALL OF OUR EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE
CEASEFIRE SO THAT WE CAN PROCEED WITH THE MAJOR TASK OF
SECURING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. SINCERELY, HENRY A.
KISSINGER. UNQTE. KISSINGER

BT

#2589

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10/27/73 EXT 22670

APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCES:

NEA MR ATHERTON

NEA MR SISCO

S/S MR PICKERING

S MR EAGLEBURGER

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 08688 272142Z

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-25 AF-10 ACDA-19 IO-14 SSO-00 CCO-00

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INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 DRC-01 /159 W

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27/624Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 303

SECRET TEL AVIV 8688
RE:O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, IS
SUBJECT: AIRLIFT

REF: MAC MSG DTG 270836Z OCT 712

I TOOK OCCASION OF MY MEETING WITH FONMIN EBAN TODAY
TO NOTE WE WERE PHASING OUT AIRLIFT OCT 28. EBAN WAS

PLEASSED TO HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT WE WERE AUTHORIZING
UTILIZATION OF US CONTROLLED SHIPPING TO SUPPLEMENT ISRAELI
SHIPS. HE OBSERVED IMPORTANCE OF GOI BEING ABLE TO
REASSURE ISRAELI PUBLIC THAT REQUIRED MILITARY SUPPLIES
WOULD CONTINUE TO BE DELIVERED EXPEDITIOUSLY.
AVAILABILITY OF AMERICAN SHIPS FOR THIS PURPOSE WILL

BE MOST WELCOME NEWS HERE.
KEATING

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Department of State

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SECRET CAIRO 3253

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR MOPS EG IS
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY: USG ACTION

1. IT APPEARS TO US THAT FATE OF EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO US POLICY, BUT THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE TIME REMAINING BEFORE ISRAELIS PREEMPT ANY ACTION WE MAY BE ABLE TO TAKE.

2. PRESENT STATED US POSITION IS THAT WE ARE NOW PREPARED TO CONSIDER INJECTION OF US PERSONNEL TO OBSERVE CEASE-FIRE. BELIEVE THAT MOST URGENT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO PLACING FIRST CONTINGENT OF US OBSERVERS ON EDGES OF THIRD ARMY AREA, AND POSSIBLY WITHIN THIRD ARMY AREA ITSELF.

3. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT GOE WILL OBJECT. IF ANYTHING, ALL INDICATORS SUGGEST THE OPPOSITE.

4. AT SAME TIME, US MAY WISH TO INFORM GOI THAT IT IS NOT PREPARED TO SEE THE SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION OF THIRD ARMY.

SMITH

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

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Z 271047Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0299

SECRET TEL AVIV 8673

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS
SUBJ: EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY

REF: A. CAIRO 3245, 3248, 3249
B. DAO TEL AVIV 1992 DTG 270106Z OCT 73
C. GENEVA 5682

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
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NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SCHNEIDER _____
V.I.G. _____
WALSH _____

1. AS I SEE IT, FATE OF THIRD ARMY APPEARS CENTRAL TO OUR HOPES OF CREATION OF STABLE CEASEFIRE IN SOUTH WHICH IN TURN SY MS BASIC TO AVOIDING FURTHER SERIOUS STRAINS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS, WHICH, WITH RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL INPUTS, IT BASIS FOR ANY HOPES FOR MOVING PARTIES TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. ISRAELIS DO NOT HIDE FACT THAT FINAL LIND IN SIEGE CHAIN AROUND THIRD ARMY WAS FORGED BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND CEASEFIRES (CUTTING FINAL SUPPLY ROAD ON WEST BANK AND ISOLATING SUEZ CITY). THEY MAINTAIN, OF COURSE, THAT EGYPTIANS WERE (AND ARE) RESPONSIBLE FOR TAKING INITIATIVE FOR FIRST (AND OTHER) VIOLATIONS OF CEASEFIRES(S) AND IDF REACTED IN TIMELY MANNER TO TAKE PRIME OBJECTIVES. SINCE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS NOT TO TRY TO DETERMINE WHO SHOT FIRST, I WILL LEAVE THIS PARTICULAR SUBJECT, AS IT NOT GERMANE TO MAIN THRUST OF THIS MESSAGE.

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3. THERE IS UNDOUBTEDLY CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON GOI FROM MILITARY COMMANDERS IN SOUTHERN SUEZ FRONT TO GIVE AUTHORITY TO IDF TO FORCE SURRENDER TO THIRD ARMY ELEMENTS TRAPPED ON EAST BANK, ESTIMATED AT UP TO 30-35,000 MEN. PREFERRED OPTION OF IDF, AS DEP PRIME MIN ALLON INTIMATED TO ME ON OCT 24, HAD BEEN TO "FINISH OFF" ALL EGYPTIAN ARMY ON SUEZ FRONT, A MOVE WHICH HE RECOGNIZED WAS TEMPTING MILITARILY BUT UNWISE POLITICALLY FROM INTERNATIONAL POINT OF VIEW. THIS OPTION, HE NOTED, HAD BEEN EXPLICITLY REJECTED BY GOI WHEN IT ACCEPTED SC RES. 338, AND CEASEFIRE. IF, HOWEVER, EGYPTIAN SECOND ARMY INDEED JOINS FRAY TO EXTRICATE TRAPPED THIRD ARMY--AS IDF APPARENTLY BELIEVES IS LIKELIHOOD--THEN THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES AND CEASEFIRE WILL GO UP IN SMOKE, WITH UNPREDICTABLE WIDER IMPLICATIONS.

4. WE DO NOT KNOW HERE IF GOI HAS ORDERED IDF QUIETLY TO SQUEEZE THIRD ARMY INTO SURRENDER (ALLON A FEW DAYS AGO SUGGESTED WITH TRAP SHU, POL AND WATER LINES CUT, EGYPTIANS COULD ONLY LAST UP TO WEEK WITHOUT GIVING UP.), OR IF ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO ALLOW ENOUGH ESSENTIAL, HUMANITARIAN HELP THROUGH TO KEEP THIRD ARMY ALIVE, BUT HELPLESS. WIDELY PUBLICIZED (BY GOI) DISPATCH OF 200 UNITS OF PLASMA FROM ISRAEL TO THIRD ARMY THROUGH RED CROSS CHANNELS, AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE DAYAN'S

RECENT REMARKS (TEL AVIV 8654) AS POLITICAL RESTRAINTS ON IDF MILITARY GOALS OF "DESTRUCTION OF ARAB ARMIES AND THEIR WEAPONS," ARE SUGGESTIONS THAT GOI IS AT LEAST CONSIDERING NOT FORCING SURRENDER OF THIRD ARMY, IF INDEED DECISION TO THAT EFFECT NOT ALREADY TAKEN.

5. AS I SEE IT, PERSONNEL OF THIRD ARMY, WHETHER ACTUALLY CAPTURED OR TRAPPED, ARE MOST IMPORTANT CHIPS FOR GOI IN ATTEMPT FORCE EGYPTIANS TO AGREE TO RAPID EXCHANGE OF POWS, A MOST SIGNIFICANT DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUE HERE. I GATHER EGYPTIANS ARE STILL DRAGGING THEIR FEET, PROBABLY ON ASSUMPTION ISRAELI POWS WILL FETCH QUITE A PRICE IN CONCESSIONS FROM THE GOI.

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6. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I RECOMMEND WE MOVE FAST ON A NUMBER OF FRONTS, IF WE HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, TO AVOID WHAT APPEARS TO BE WORST CASE SHORT TERM MILITARY POSSIBILITY IN SOUTH-ENGAGEMENT OF IDF AND EGYPTIAN ARMIES ALL ALONG SUEZ FRONT:

A. GET SOVIETS TO INDUCE EGYPTIANS TO AGREE TO EARLY EXCHANGE OF POWS. (THIS IS CRUCIAL.)

B. GET GOI TO AGREE NOT TO FORCE SURRENDER OF THIRD ARMY.

C. GET SOVIET AND EGYPTIANS TO FORCE COMMANDERS OF THIRD AND SECOND ARMIES TO STOP SHOOTING, OR NOT TO START SHOOTING. REASSURANCE THAT GOI NOT TRYING TO OBTAIN SURRENDER OF THIRD ARMY IS KEY TO SUCCESS HERE.

7. SINCE THINGS APPEAR TO HAVE THEIR OWN MOMENTUM OUT HERE WITH SUCH POTENTIALLY DIRE CONSEQUENCES, IT IS OBVIOUS ALL OF THE ABOVE SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN MATTER OF HOURS, NOT DAYS. I WOULD APPRECIATE QUICK RESPONSE TO ABOVE. IF I'M WRONG OR IF THINGS ARE ALREADY IN HAND, I WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING. IF I'M RIGHT AND THINGS ARE NOT IN HAND AND WE NEED TO MOVE FAST, PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHAT I CAN DO. IN THIS RESPECT, I HAVE APPOINTMENT AT 1700 LOCAL (1500Z) WITH FONMIN EBAN.
KEATING

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /031 W

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FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4124
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
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SECRET CAIRO 3250

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS

DEBORCHGRAVE STATES THAT THIS MORNING HE WAS CALLED
URGENTLY TO MEET WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR SAYED
MARI. MARI SAID SADAT WANTED TO GIVE DEBORCHGRAVE
FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

A. THE THIRD ARMY WAS SURROUNDED AFTER REPEAT
AFTER THE CEASEFIRE.

B. EGYPT RESPECTED AND BELIEVED THE "GUARANTEES
AND ASSURANCES" GIVEN BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US.

C. EGYPT WARNED THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US THAT
ISRAEL WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CEASEFIRE TO TRY TO
CUT OFF THE THIRD ARMY, BUT BOTH SUPERPOWERS
TOLD CAIRO NOT TO WORRY AS THE US HAD RECEIVED AN
APPROPRIATE PLEDGE FROM ISRAEL THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE
THE CASE.

D. THE CREDIBILITY OF BOTH SUPERPOWERS IS NOW
ON THE LINE AS THE THIRD ARMY'S SURVIVAL HAS BEEN
JEOPARDIZED BY AN ISRAELI DOUBLECROSS OF THE US.

E. THE TWO SUPERPOWERS NOWKNOW EXACTLY WHAT

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGOTIANTS _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
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V.L.S. _____
WALSH _____

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
PAGE 02 CAIRO 03250 271030Z

ISRAEL IS TRYING TO DO TO THE THIRD ARMY, DESPITE THE
CEASEFIRE.

F. THE ISRAELIS HAVE REFUSED TO ALLOW WATER OR
BLOOD PLASMA TO GET THROUGH TO THE THIRD ARMY.

G. MORE ISRAELI TROOPS ARE NOW MOVING THROUGH
MITLA PASS TO REINFORCE THE SIEGE OF EGYPT'S THIRD ARMY.

H. THE SERIOUSNESS OF NIXON AND BREZHNEV WILL NOW
BE JUDGED BY WHAT HAPPENS TO THE THIRD ARMY.
SMITH



Department of State

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

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O 270200Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2401

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5184

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-81
TAGS: PBDR, MOPS, XF, NATO
SUBJECT: U.S. ACTION REGARDING MIDDLE EAST: PERMREPS LUNCH
OCTOBER 26

REF: USNATO 5179

BEGIN SUMMARY: AT PERMREPS LUNCH OCTOBER 26, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING NAC MEETING ON MIDDLE EAST REPORTED REFTEL, RUMSFELD RESPONDED TO CRITICISM VOICED AT NAC REGARDING LACK OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF U.S. ALERT ACTIONS AND LACK OF INFORMATION ON U.S.-SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS. REVIEWING RECORD OF CONSULTATION, RUMSFELD STATED ALLIES HAVE BEEN KEPT ADVISED OF U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN ABUNDANT OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALLIES TO MAKE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT DURING CURRENT WORK ON ATLANTIC RELATIONS SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING ALLIANCE'S CONSULTATION PROCEDURES, WOULD BE FORTHCOMING, AS OPPOSED TO SIMPLY COMPLAINTS. HE NOTED THAT U.S. MOVES SEEMED TO HAVE HAD THE DESIRED EFFECT ON THE SOVIETS AND THOUGHT THE ALLIES MIGHT HAVE FOUND SOME SATISFACTION IN THAT. RUMSFELD SAID, ON PERSONAL BASIS, HE MAKES NO APOLOGIES FOR U.S. ACTIONS WHATSOEVER. HE ADDED HE WOULD LISTEN WITH INTEREST TO CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE CONSULTATION. GENERAL THRUST OF COMMENTS BY OTHER PERMREPS WAS TO REGRET BEING COMPLETELY UNINFORMED ABOUT U.S.-SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS AND BEING CAUGHT BY SURPRISE BY U.S. ALERT MEASURES WHILE AT THE SAME TIME BEING ASKED BY U.S. TO

ANDERSON
HORNATS
JORDEN
KENNEDY
LEHMAN
LEVINE
NEGROPONTE
OCCEN
RATLIFF
RONDON
SAUNDERS
SONNENFELD
V. I. G.
VALSH

R

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DEMONSTRATE ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING BRIEF REMARKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST BY DE STAERCKE AND CATALAND, RUMSFELD, ON PERSONAL BASIS, COMMENTED ON THE STATEMENTS MADE BY OTHERS DURING THE NAC MEETING IN THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 26 (REFTEL). RUMSFELD SAID THAT HE HAD GIVEN A GOOD DEAL OF THOUGHT TO THE CRISIS AND TO THE DELIBERATIONS IN THE COUNCIL; ON REFLECTION HE WOULD MAKE NO APOLOGIES FOR U.S. ACTIONS THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD. LOOKING AT THE CHRONOLOGY OF CONSULTATIONS, THE RECORD SHOWED THAT THE ALLIES HAD BEEN KEPT INFORMED BY THE UNITED STATES AS TO ITS POLICY OBJECTIVES. DURING THIS TIME THERE HAD BEEN NUMEROUS OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE ALLIES TO OFFER RECOMMENDATIONS OR ADVICE. THE UNITED STATES HAD PROVIDED A REASONABLY FULL EXPOSITION OF ITS POLICY OBJECTIVES AS RELATED TO THE ALERT IN HIS INTERVENTION IN THE COUNCIL MEETING OF OCTOBER 25. GIVEN ALL THE ACTIVITY RELATED TO THE U.S. PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES, ALL OF WHICH OCCURRED WITHIN A MATTER OF A SMALL NUMBER OF HOURS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT, IT WAS NOT SURPRISING THAT THE CONSULTATION PROCESS MIGHT BE A FEW HOURS BEHIND EVENTS. RUMSFELD NOTED THAT IN THE COUNCIL MEETING EARLIER IN THE DAY THERE HAD BEEN A SUGGESTION THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT HAVE OVER-REACTED IN ORDERING THE ALERT. THE FACT IS, RUMSFELD SAID, THE ALERT HAD APPARENTLY WORKED SO FAR AND PERHAPS THAT SHOULD BE THE TEST. HE ADDED THAT CONVENING A COUNCIL MEETING IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT MIGHT HAVE ALSO BEEN SEEN AS OVER-REACTING, AND ALLIES CAN'T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS.

2. RUMSFELD WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN A LITTLE SURPRISED, IN REFLECTING ON THE MORNING'S COUNCIL MEETING, THAT MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE HAD NOT EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT TENSIONS HAD APPARENTLY BEEN SOMEWHAT REDUCED, THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SOVIETS INJECTING TROOPS INTO THE MIDDLE EAST SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REDUCED, AND THAT THE DETENTE POLICY OF THE ALLIANCE WAS, AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT, NOT RUPTURED.

3. RUMSFELD REFERRED TO THE EFFECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS ON THE ONGOING WORK ON THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION, A SUBJECT WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED IN THE MORNING'S COUNCIL MEETING. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT, IF THERE WERE SUGGESTIONS, THEY WOULD NOW BE PUT FORWARD. IT WAS A GOOD DEAL EASIER TO CRITICIZE THAN IT WAS TO BUILD, AND HE HAD NOT SEEN MANY SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW



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THE CONSULTATION PROCESS COULD BE IMPROVED. RUMSFELD ADDED THE HOPE THAT, AFTER FURTHER REFLECTING, THE INSTRUCTED VIEWS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD NOT REFLECT THE TONE THAT HAD BEEN SET IN THE PRECEDING COUNCIL MEETING.

4. BOSS (FRG CHARGE) SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WERE TWO ASPECTS TO THE PROBLEM, ONE SUBSTANTIVE, THE OTHER METHOD. HE SAID HE KNEW OF NO ONE IN THE ALLIANCE WHO DISAGREED WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT THE U.S. DID WITH THE SOVIETS. THE QUESTIONS RELATED TO METHOD. EVERYONE, HE SAID, WAS AWARE OF THE LONELY RESPONSIBILITY OF A POWER SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES.

5. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) SAID THAT HE THOUGHT RUMSFELD WAS RIGHT ON EACH OF HIS POINTS BUT THAT HIS CONCLUSION MIGHT BE WRONG. AN ALLIANCE, DE STAERCKE SAID, REQUIRES A GREAT "CAPITAL OF FRIENDSHIP." IT WAS IMPORTANT IN ANY ATLANTIC DIALOGUE THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD MAKE GOOD USE OF ITS FRIENDS.

6. ERALP (TURKEY) SAID HE FELT THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HELP ITS FRIENDS TO BE ITS FRIENDS. THE COUNCIL, HE BELIEVED, SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED PRIOR TO THE ALERT SINCE IT INVOLVED U.S. FORCES THROUGHOUT THE ALLIANCE COUNTRIES. IT WAS WRONG THAT THE ALLIES ALL RECEIVED THAT INFORMATION FIRST FROM THE PRESS.

7. SVART (DENMARK) SAID THAT HE HAD COME TO TWO CONCLUSIONS: 1) THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT BLUFFING WHEN THEY INDICATED THEY MIGHT PUT TROOPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; 2) HE WAS QUITE SURE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE REACTED TO A FAR GREATER EXTENT THAN THE U.S., HAD THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST BEEN REVERSED.

8. BUSCH (NORWAY) SAID THAT NORWAY DID FEEL THEY NEEDED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THE BILATERAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 5184

EXDIS

9. DE ROSE (FRANCE) SAID THAT HE FELT THE ALLIES SHOULD TRY TO AGREE ON A CODE OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO CRISES OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCE AREA. HE ASKED THE U.S. TO PUT ITSELF IN THE SHOES OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE AND THINK THROUGH THE TWO INTERVENTIONS MADE BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE COUNCIL (OCTOBER 16, OCTOBER 25). WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST INTERVENTION, THE UNITED STATES HAD ASKED THE ALLIES, IN THE INTEREST OF PRESERVING DETENTE, TO MAKE DEMARCHES TO THE SOVIET UNION INDICATING THAT THEY CONSIDERED DETENTE TO BE IN JEOPARDY. YET THE ALLIES DESPITE REPEATED QUESTIONS, DID NOT EVEN KNOW IF THE UNITED STATES WAS MAKING A SIMILAR DEMARCHE OR WHAT THE REACTIONS WERE FROM THE SOVIET SIDE. INDEED, SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD MADE AN ALMOST SIMULTANEOUS PUBLIC STATEMENT INDICATING THAT DETENTE WAS NOT IN JEOPARDY. IT LOOKED AS IF THE UNITED STATES WAS ASKING ITS ALLIES TO TAKE SIDES WITH THE ISRAELIS, AND THAT IS INDEED WHAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TOLD THE ARABS.

10. WITH RESPECT TO RUMSFELD'S SECOND INTERVENTION, ON OCTOBER 25, DE ROSE SAID THAT, IN HIS VIEW, THE U.S. PRECAUTIONARY ALERT AFFECTED EUROPE AND THE ALLIANCE SINCE ALL U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE WERE PLACED ON ALERT. THIS WAS A MATTER THAT RELATED TO A CONFLICT OUTSIDE OF THE ALLIANCE AND ON WHICH THE NATIONS OF THE ALLIANCE HAD DIFFERING VIEWS; YET THE UNITED STATES HAD TAKEN AN ACTION AFFECTING TROOPS STATIONED IN THE ALLIANCE WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION OR CONSULTATION. DE ROSE SAID PERSONALLY THAT IT WAS NOT WITH PLEASURE THAT HE HAD SPOKEN IN THE MORNING COUNCIL MEETING. BUT,

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WE SHOULD NOT CRY OVER SPILT MILK. RATHER WE SHOULD LOOK TO THE FUTURE. HE REPEATED THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD EXAMINE HOW IT SHOULD CONSULT ON MATTERS THAT DO NOT RELATE TO NATO TERRITORY BUT WHICH MAY HAVE SOME RELATIONSHIP TO THE ALLIANCE.

11. MENZIES (CANADA) COMMENTED THAT THERE ARE TIMES WHEN A FEW PEOPLE MUST MAKE THE DECISIONS. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE UNITED STATES CARED ABOUT ITS ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS, AND HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS HOW THE UNITED STATES WAS GOING TO DEAL WITH ITS ALLIES. WE OUGHT TO SEEK WAYS, HE THOUGHT, TO IMPROVE THE CONSULTATION PROCESS SO THAT WE CAN PRESERVE ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, GIVEN THE FACT THAT ALLIED GOVERNMENTS MUST FACE PUBLIC OPINION AND A FREE PRESS DAILY. HE THOUGHT IT WAS PERHAPS BOTH UNFORTUNATE AND FORTUITOUS THAT THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS COINCIDED WITH THE WORK ON THE ATLANTIC DECLARATIONS. THIS WOULD DEMONSTRATE VIVIDLY THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WORDS IN THE DECLARATION REGARDING CONSULTATION.

12. SPIERENBURG (NETHERLANDS) SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT PART OF THE PROBLEM WAS SUBSTANTIVE AND PART PSYCHOLOGICAL. THE ALLIES WANT A FEELING OF PARTICIPATION BUT, CONVERSELY, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES WORK TO PROVIDE SOLIDARITY. HE THOUGHT THAT THE CONSULTATION PROCESS COULD BE IMPROVED BOTH SUBSTANTIVELY AND IN ATTENTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS THE FEELING OF PARTICIPATION. RUMSFELD ADDED THAT HE KNEW THAT THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY KISSINGER, AND CERTAINLY HIMSELF, WERE ANXIOUS TO WORK TO IMPROVE ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP.

13. COMMENT: THE MOOD OF THE LUNCHEON MEETING WAS ABOUT THE SAME AS THAT OF THE MORNING'S COUNCIL MEETING, BOTH BEING SOMEWHAT TENSE. IT IS APPARENT THAT MOST OF THE ALLIES FELT EMBARRASSED BY NOT BEING EVEN GENERALLY AWARE OF WHAT HAS BEEN HAPPENING IN THE U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS. THEY WERE FURTHER SURPRISED AND MADE TO FEEL IRRELEVANT BY THE CALLING OF THE ALERT WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION INDEED WITHOUT NOTIFICATION UNTIL MORE THAN SEVEN HOURS LATER AND WITH LITTLE EXPLANATION AFTERWARDS. EACH ALLIED GOVERNMENT THAT SHARES THESE FEELINGS, AND WE SUSPECT THAT MOST DO, WILL FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO EXPRESS SYMPATHY FOR FUTURE U.S. ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ALLIANCE RELATIONS IN MY VIEW CAN FAIRLY BE DESCRIBED AS STRAINED. OUR ALLIES DO NOT SAY IT, BUT I BELIEVE THEY ARE EMBARRASSED AT NOT KNOWING WHAT



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IS GOING ON - EVEN WHAT IS GOING ON ON THEIR SOIL - WITH RESPECT TO THE PRECAUTIONARY ALERT. AND, FURTHER, THEY ARE EMBARRASSED THAT THEY ARE EMBARRASSED AND FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ANSWER TO COLLEAGUES IN THEIR GOVERNMENTS, TO THE ANTI-U.S. AND ANTI-NATO SENTIMENT, THEIR PARLIAMENTS OR THEIR PRESS. IT MAKES THEM FEEL THEY ARE NEXT TO IRRELEVANT IN THE TRULY IMPORTANT MATTERS. THIS IS THE FEELING NOT IN NATO ALONE, BUT IN ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, MANY OF WHICH ARE ORGANIZED BY COALITION OR A NARROW MARGIN OF A FEW VOTES.

13. I BELIEVE WASHINGTON SHOULD CONSIDER ACTIONS SOON TO COUNTERACT THIS PROBLEM. FURTHER, TO AVOID AGGRAVATING IT, I SUGGEST THAT SECDEF PRESS CONFERENCE COMMENTS AND DEPT OF STATE PRESS COMMENTS, AS QUOTED ON ARMED FORCES NETWORK IN EUROPE, BE MODIFIED IN FUTURE TO AVOID EXPRESSING DISSATISFACTION WITH NATO ALLIES GENERALLY. SUCH REPORTING WILL CONTRIBUTE TO COALESCING ALLIES AGAINST U.S. ON MIDEAST ISSUE. IF U.S. HAS REASON TO BE CRITICAL OF SPECIFIC EUROPEAN ALLIES WE SHOULD SO SPECIFY, AND NOT LUMP THEM ALL TOGETHER. END COMMENT.

14. DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED.

RUMSFELD

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0548

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3677
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0769
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4493
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1245
AMEMBASSY LONDON 8200
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4663
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0691
AMEMBASSY PARIS 0299
AMEMBASSY ROME 3389
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4276
USINT CAIRO 3530
USLO PEKING 0111
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM 2106
AMCONGEN HONG KONG 1841

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 4249

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UN, XF
SUBJ: SC MEETING, OCT 26
SUMMARY: SC MET OCT 26 AT EGYPTIAN REQUEST TO CONSIDER FURTHER
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF CEASEFIRE BY ISRAEL. AFTER MORE THAN
FOUR HOURS OF INEFFECTIVE DISCUSSION, COUNCIL ADJOURNED AT
10 PM TO MEET AGAIN 10:30 AM SAT, OCT 27. COUNCIL AUTHORIZED
"AS AN INTERIM MEASURE" SYG TO SEND ADDITIONAL TROOPS FROM
UNFICYP FORCES TO CAIRO FOR UNEF (SEPTEN). END SUMMARY.

1. EGYPT REPORTED TO SC THAT AT 1340 HOURS LOCAL OCT 26
"NEW HOSTILITIES" HAD BROKEN OUT ON THE SUEZ AND SINAI FRONTS.
NOTING THAT SECSTATE KISSINGER SAID IN OCT 25 PRESS CONFERENCE
THAT ISRAELIS HAD GAINED TERRITORY AFTER ORIGINAL OCT 22 CEASEFIRE,
EGYPTIAN EDNMIN ZAYYAT SAID ISRAEL NOW ATTEMPTING TO
MAKE EGYPTIAN TROOPS IN SINAI SURRENDER OR FLEE IN DISARRAY AND
WERE ATTACKING SUEZ CITY. HE ALSO NOTED REPORT BY ICRC REP
THAT ISRAEL HAD PREVENTED A RED CROSS SHIPMENT OF BLOOD, MEDICINES
AND OTHER SUPPLIES FROM REACHING EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS IN SINAI.

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HE SAID COUNCIL SHOULD CONDEMN ISRAEL'S DELIBERATE INTERFERENCE WITH HUMANITARIAN MISSION.

2. ZAMBIA ASKED TO APPEAR BEFORE SC. PERM DEL NOTED ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE, CONTEMPT FOR UN RESCS AND SAID PEACE COULD COME TO ME ONLY WHEN ISRAEL WITHDRAWS FROM ARAB TERRITORIES. HE ANNOUNCED GOZ BREAK OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

3. ISRAELI PERM REP SAID EGYPT WAS USING TWO STRATEGEMS: (1) ATTACK ISRAELI FORCES WHILE ACCUSING ISRAEL OF BREAKING CEASEFIRE, THEN ACCUSING ISRAEL OF ATTACKING WHEN ITS FORCES REACTED TO EGYPTIAN ASSAULT, AND (2) CLAIM "NEW WAR", OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING WHEN NO FIGHTING GOING ON. THIS CREATES ATMOSPHERE OF HATE AND CALUMNY. EGYPT CONTINUES TO FAN THE FLAMES OF BELLIGERENCY. EGYPTIANS FALSEHOODS BROUGHT WORLD TO BRINK OF GLOBAL WAR.

4. SAUDI ARABIA ATTACKED ISRAELI INTERFERENCE WITH ICRC CONVOY OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO SURROUNDED EGYPTIANS AND ASKED THE SUPER POWERS TO PROVIDE STAFF OR NOMINATE STAFF FROM NEUTRALS TO ESCORT CONVOY.

5. SOVIET UNION, SUPPORTING EGYPTIAN CLAIMS OF NEW ISRAELI AGGRESSION TURNED TO QUESTION OF WHY USG CANNOT MAKE ISRAEL ADHERE TO CEASEFIRE. RHETORICALLY ASKED IF ANYBODY BELIEVED US IMPOTENT, UNABLE MAKE ISRAEL COMPLY? SOV PERM REP ALSO QUOTED FACT OF ISRAELI VIOLATION ADMITTED BY SECSTATE KISSINGER IN PRESS CONFERENCE. INSTEAD OF DOING SOMETHING TO IMPLEMENT SC RESCS, US KEEPS UP STEADY FLOW OF ARMS. AFTER NOW RITUAL ATTACK ON CHINESE, SOV PERM REP BEGAN QUOTING FROM BREZHNEV STATEMENT TO WORLD PEACE MEETING CURRENTLY IN SESSION MOSCOW. COMMENT: WE ASSUME DEPT HAS TEXT. MOST PERTINENT SECTION INVOLVED SADAT REQUEST THAT USSR AND US SEND REPS TO OVERSEE CARRYING OUT OF SC RESCS. "WE AGREED AND HAVE ALREADY SENT REPS--WE HOPE US WILL DO THE SAME. WE ARE CONSIDERING OTHER MEASURES WHICH THE SITUATION MAY REQUIRE." END COMMENT. PERM REP WENT ON TO CALL UNEF CREATION "USEFUL DECISION". SAID USSR READY COLLABORATE WITH ALL COUNTRIES CONCERNED, BUT NOT RPT NOT HELPED BY ACTIONS TAKEN IN CERTAIN CIRCLES OF NATO COUNTRIES--FOMENTING FEAR BY FOMENTING FANTASTIC RUMORS ABOUT SOV INTENTIONS.

6. REMAINDER OF MEETING DEVOTED LARGELY TO RIGHTS OF REPLY BY EGYPT, SYRIA, SUDAN, US, CHINA, USSR, ISRAEL, AND SAUDI ARABIA. LITTLE WAS ADDED TO PREVIOUS STATEMENTS AND KNOWN POSITIONS. SYRIA DID HARK BACK TO JUNE 1967 CEASEFIRE WHICH THEY HAD ACCEPTED JUNE 9 AND ISRAEL SUCCESSIVELY VIOLATED UNTIL JUNE 12, TAKING IN COURSE OF VIOLATION THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THEY SUGGESTED PRESENT ISRAELI TACTICS IN SINAI AND SUEZ WERE REPEAT.

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PERFORMANCES.

7. AT END OF LENGTHY SESSION, INDIA PROPOSED INTERIM STRENGTHENING OF UNLF (SEPTIL) AND THAT SYG AND SC PRES SEND URGENT TELEGRAMS APPEALING TO ALL PARTIES FOR FULL AND EFFECTIVE COOPERATION WITH ICRC. YUGOSLAVIA SECUNDED INDIAN PROPOSAL AND URGED SPEEDY ARRANGEMENTS TO SEND MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND OTHER NECESSITIES TO EGYPTIAN TROOPS AND CIVILIANS CUT OFF BY ISRAELI FORCES.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3440

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 1647
USMISSION BERLIN 1753
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 1630
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 1524
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 1738
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 1412
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 2102
USMISSION NATU 484
USMISSION USUN 3271

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 13462
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR UR US
SUBJ: TASS STATEMENT ON U.S. ALERT

1. TASS ENGLISH WIRE AT 0643 MOSCOW TIME OCTOBER 27 CARRIES FOLLOWING TASS STATEMENT.
"IN CONNECTION WITH THE EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, REPORTS ABOUT THE ALERT OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN SOME AREAS, INCLUDING EUROPE, WERE MADE IN WASHINGTON.

" TRYING TO JUSTIFY THIS STEP, OFFICIALS MADE REFERENCE TO SOME ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION THAT ALLEGEDLY GIVE THE GROUNDS FOR CONCERN.

"TASS IS AUTHORIZED TO STATE THAT SUCH EXPLANATIONS ARE ABSURED SINCE THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE AIMED SOLELY AT PROMOTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON CEASE-FIRE AND RESTORATION OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

"THIS STEP OF THE UNITED STATES THAT DOES NOT RPT NOT PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL DETENTE BY FAR WAS TAKEN OBVIOUSLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO INTIMIDATE THE SOVIET UNION. BUT THOSE WHO ARE BEHIND THIS STEP SHOULD BE TOLD THAT THEY HAVE CHOSEN THE WRONG

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ADDRESS."

2. ISSUANCE OF THIS STATEMENT AS ACCOMPANIMENT
TO BREZHNEV SPEECH OF LAST NIGHT INDICATES THAT
SOVIETS FELT NEED TO MAKE SHARP PUBLIC
RESPONSE TO US. ALERT BUT DECIDED THAT SUCH A
RESPONSE DID NOT FIT WITH THE MORE RESTRAINED
TONE OF THE BREZHNEV SPEECH.

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TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4104

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8169

S E C R E T STATE 212522

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARK
SUBJECT: UNEF AND UNTSO

REF: USUN 421

1. WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY WALDHEIM'S QUICK ACTION IN MOVING UN FORCES FROM CYPRUS TO EGYPT AND HIS RESISTANCE TO USSR ATTEMPT TO STAMPEDE HIM INTO ACCEPTANCE OF 70 SOVIET OBSERVERS IN UNTSO. SINCE WALDHEIM IS OBVIOUSLY GOING TO BE UNDER CONTINUING SOVIET PRESSURE ON UNTSO AND UNEF MATTERS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU KEEP LEANING ON HIM FROM OUR SIDE AS WELL.

2. RE TEKDAH'S REMARKS ON ARMAMENT OF UNEF, PREVIOUS PEACEKEEPING FORCES HAVE ALL HAD LIGHT ARMS AND EQUIPMENT FOR PERSONNEL DEFENSE AND MOBILITY. UNEF WILL OBVIOUSLY NEED SAME. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE, BESIDE PERSONAL WEAPONS, MACHINE GUNS MOUNTED ON JEEPS OR ARMORED CARS, TEAR GAS, HAND GRENADES, HELICOPTERS, TRANSPORT AND RECON AIRCRAFT. WE DO NOT ENVISAGE FORCE UNDERTAKING OFFENSIVE ACTION.

3. RE TEKDAH'S STRESS ON UNEF EXCLUSIVE DUTY TO ASSIST PARTIES, HE SHOULD RECALL THAT INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ALSO HAS AN INTEREST IN MAINTENANCE OF CEASE-FIRE, AND THAT PARTIES HAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO RECOGNIZE AND ACCOMMODATE THEMSELVES TO THAT INTEREST. QUESTIONS AS TO NATIONALITY OF UNEF CONTINGENTS, FIXING OF CEASE-

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FIRE LINES, ETC. WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT WITH THAT INTEREST AS WELL AS VIEWS OF PARTIES IN MIND.

4. CONFIRMING TELECONS, WHILE WE WOULD OF COURSE RATHER NOT HAVE ANY SOVIET AND US OBSERVERS, YOU MAY WORK OUT ARRANGEMENT FOR THEM WITH SYG IF NECESSARY. THESE SHOULD BE FEW IN NUMBER (PERHAPS 20 OFFICERS FROM EACH SIDE) AND SHOULD BE RECRUITED AND SERVE AT REQUEST OF SYG AND AS REGULAR UNTSO MEMBERS UNDER COMMAND OF UNTSO CHIEF OF STAFF.

5. RE UNEF YOU MAY IF NECESSARY AGREE TO ROMANIAN CONTINGENT. THIS SHOULD FACILITATE OUR GETTING THE NATO CONTINGENT IN RETURN -- PERHAPS DANISH OR NORWEGIAN. (THEY HAVE STANDBY FORCES FOR SUCH A CONTINGENCY.) KISSINGER
BT

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0299

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8673

EXDIS
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG IS
SUBJ: EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY
REF: A. CAIRO 3245, 3248, 3249
B. DAD TEL AVIV 1992 DTG 270106Z OCT 73
C. GENEVA 5682

1. AS I SEE IT, FATE OF THIRD ARMY APPEARS CENTRAL IN OUR HOPES OF CREATION OF STABLE CEASEFIRE IN SOUTH WHICH IN TURN SY MS BASIC TO AVOIDING FURTHER SERIOUS STRAINS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS, WHICH, WITH RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL INPUTS, IT BASIS FOR ANY HOPES FOR MOVING PARTIES TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. ISRAELIS DO NOT HIDE FACT THAT FINAL LINE IN SIFGE CHAIN AROUND THIRD ARMY WAS FORGED BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND CEASE-FIRES (CUTTING FINAL SUPPLY ROAD ON WEST BANK AND ISOLATING SUEZ CITY). THEY MAINTAIN, OF COURSE, THAT EGYPTIANS WERE (AND ARE) RESPONSIBLE FOR TAKING INITIATIVE FOR FIRST (AND OTHER) VIOLATIONS OF CEASEFIRES(S) AND IDF REACTED IN TIMELY MANNER TO TAKE PRIME OBJECTIVES. SINCE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS NOT TO TRY TO DETERMINE WHO SHOT FIRST, I WILL LEAVE THIS PARTICULAR SUBJECT, AS IT NOT GERMANE TO MAIN THRUST OF THIS MESSAGE.

3. THERE IS UNDOUBTEDLY CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON GOI FROM MILITARY COMANDERS IN SOUTHERN SUEZ FRONT OT GIVE AUTHORITY TO IDF TO FORCE SURRENDER OF THIRD ARMY ELEMENTS TRAPPED ON EAST BANK, ESTIMATED AT UP TO 30-35,000 MEN. PREFERRED OPTION OF IDF, AS DEP PRIME MIN ALLON INTIMATED TO ME ON OCT 24, HAD BEEN TO "FINISH OFF" ALL EGYPTIAN ARMY ON SUEZ FRONT,

* * * * * W H S R C O M M E N T * * * * *

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A MOVE WHICH HE RECOGNIZED WAS TEMPTING MILITARILY BUT UNWISE POLITICALLY FROM INTERNATIONAL POINT OF VIEW. THIS OPTION, HE NOTED, HAD BEEN EXPLICITLY REJECTED BY GOI WHEN IT ACCEPTED SC RES. 338. AND CEASEFIRE. IF, HOWEVER, EGYPTIAN SECOND ARMY INDEED JOINS FRAY TO EXTRICATE TRAPPED THIRD ARMY--AS IDF APPARENTLY BELIEVES IS LIKELY--THEN THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES AND CEASEFIRE WILL GO UP IN SMOKE, WITH UNPREDICTABLE WIDE IMPLICATIONS.

4. WE DO NOT KNOW HERE IF GOI HAS ORDERED IDF QUIETLY TO SQUEEZE THIRD ARMY INTO SURRENDER (ALLON A FEW DAYS AGO SUGGESTED WITH TRAP SHU, POL AND WATER LINES CUT, EGYPTIANS COULD ONLY LAST UP TO WEEK WITHOUT GIVING UP.), OR IF ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO ALLOW ENOUGH ESSENTIAL, HUMANITARIAN HELP THROUGH TO KEEP THIRD ARMY ALIVE, BUT HELPLESS. WIDELY PUBLICIZED (BY GOI) DISPATCH OF 200 UNITS OF PLASMA FROM ISRAEL TO THIRD ARMY THROUGH RED CROSS CHANNELS, AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE DAYAN'S RECENT REMARKS (TEL AVIV 8654) RE POLITICAL RESTRAINTS ON IDF MILITARY GOALS OF "DESTRUCTION OF ARAB ARMIES AND THEIR WEAPONS," ARE SUGGESTIONS THAT GOI IS AT LEAST CONSIDERING NOT FORCING SURRENDER OF THIRD ARMY, IF INDEED DECISION TO THAT EFFECT NOT ALREADY TAKEN.

5. AS I SEE IT, PERSONNEL OF THIRD ARMY, WHETHER ACTUALLY CAPTURED OR TRAPPED, ARE MOST IMPORTANT CHIEFS FOR GOI IN ATTEMPT FORCE EGYPTIANS TO AGREE TO RAPID EXCHANGE OF POWS, A MOST SIGNIFICANT DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUE HERE. I GATHER EGYPTIANS ARE STILL DRAGGING THEIR FEET, PROBABLY ON ASSUMPTION ISRAELI POWS WILL FETCH QUITE A PRICE IN CONCESSIONS FROM THE GOI.

6. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I RECOMMEND WE MOVE FAST ON A NUMBER OF FRONTS, IF WE HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, TO AVOID WHAT APPEARS TO BE WORST CASE SHORT TERM MILITARY POSSIBILITY IN SOUTH--ENGAGEMENT OF IDF AND EGYPTIAN ARMIES ALL ALONG SUEZ FRONT:

- A. GET SOVIETS TO INDUCE EGYPTIANS TO AGREE TO EARLY EXCHANGE OF POWS. (THIS IS CRUCIAL.)
- B. GET GOI TO AGREE NOT TO FORCE SURRENDER OF THIRD ARMY.
- C. GET SOVIET AND EGYPTIANS TO FORCE COMMANDERS OF THIRD AND SECOND ARMIES TO STOP SHOOTING, OR NOT TO START SHOOTING. REASSURANCE THAT GOI NOT TRYING TO OBTAIN SURRENDER OF THIRD ARMY IS KEY TO SUCCESS HERE.

7. SINCE THINGS APPEAR TO HAVE THEIR OWN MOMENTUM OUT HERE WITH SUCH POTENTIALLY DIRE CONSEQUENCES, IT IS OBVIOUS ALL OF THE ABOVE SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN MATTER OF HOURS,

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NOT DAYS. I WOULD APPRECIATE QUICK RESPONSE TO ABOVE.
IF I'M WRONG OR IF THINGS ARE ALREADY IN HAND, I WOULD APPRECIATE
KNOWING. IF I'M RIGHT AND THINGS ARE NOT IN HAND AND WE
NEED TO MOVE FAST, PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHAT I CAN DO. IN THIS
RESPECT, I HAVE APPOINTMENT AT 1700 LOCAL (1500Z) WITH
FUNMIN LBAH.
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INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 1310
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1581
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3391
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2250

S E C R E T CAIRO 3249

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR MOPS FC IS PINT

SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN VIEW OF THIRD ARMY SITUATION
REF CAIRO 3248

1. LAST NIGHT I SPENT THREE HOURS TALKING TO SAAD EL SARKI OF ARAB LEAGUE, CAIRO. EL SARKI, A FORMER POLICE GENERAL, IS WELL LOCKED IN TO OVERALL EGYPTIAN SITUATION AND PERSONALLY A VERY MODERATE, REASONABLE MAN. IN HIS LONG CONVERSATION HE SUBSTANTIATED ALMOST COMPLETELY OUR PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION REPORT GIVEN IN REFTEL. TOWARD THE END OF THE EVENING AND IN IMPASSIONED TONES, HE ASKED WHY THE ISRAELIS MUST STEAL VICTORY FROM THE ARABS AND AGAIN MAKE THEM FEEL THE STING OF DEFEAT? HE SAID IT COULD NOT HAPPEN, MUST NOT HAPPEN, AND WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN AND EGYPTIANS WOULD FIGHT WITH EVERYTHING AT THEIR DISPOSAL TO PREVENT IT.

2. WE BELIEVE THAT EL SARKI WAS VOICING A FEELING THAT HAS HIGH CURRENCY AMONGST THE TOP MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP. UNLESS THE PRESSURE ON THE THIRD ARMY IS STOPPED AND FOOD AND WATER SUPPLIES ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO THEM QUICKLY, THERE IS THE REAL POSSIBILITY OF A FULL RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING AND DESTRUCTION OF THE CONDITIONS WHICH NOW EXIST FOR A POSSIBLE

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 6481
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 5022
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 0601
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2177
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3927

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8674

EXDIS
E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, SY, JU
SUBJECT: ISRAEL AND JORDANIAN FORCES IN SYRIA
REF: A. AMMAN 5710
B. AMMAN 5712

1. TWICE THIS WEEK IN CONTEXT OTHER CONVERSATIONS
PRIMIN MEIR HAS VOICED PUZZLEMENT TO ME
ABOUT CONTINUATION OF JORDANIAN PRESENCE IN SYRIA. AS
SHE EXPLAINED, ISRAEL HAD HOPED THAT COMPLETE SILENCE
ON SYRIAN FRONT, PLUS JORDAN'S OWN ACCEPTANCE OF
CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION AND PRIOR EGYPTIAN ACCEPTANCE,
WOULD HAVE PROVIDED KING HUSSEIN BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL.
MRS MEIR, AND OTHER ISRAELI LEADERS MILITARY AND CIVILIAN,
HAVE CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE OVER IDF'S ABILITY
TO CONTAIN ANY RENewed ATTACKS BY ARABS IN SYRIA. HOWEVER,
UNDER PRESENT AND FORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES, THE
IDF DOES NOT PLAN TO ATTACK; AMONG OTHER REASONS, SUCH
AN ISRAELI ACTION WOULD HAVE EFFECT OF CREATING IRAQI-SYRIAN
UNITED FRONT, AND ISRAELIS ARE QUITE AWARE OF CURRENT
SUSPICIONS AND GROWING DISTRUST BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA AND THEY
LIKE IT THIS WAY.

2. I AM CERTAIN, THEREFORE, ISRAEL WANTS JORDANIAN WITH-

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DRAWAL FROM SYRIA SIMPLY OUT OF DESIRE TO MINIMIZE TO
GREATEST POSSIBLE EXTENT ANY CONCEIVABLE CHANCE OF FUTURE
ISRAEL-JORDANIAN CLASHES, AND NOT BECAUSE OF AN ISRAELI
DESIRE TO SEE ARAB FORCES ON SYRIAN FRONT WEAKENED FOR
PURPOSES OF SOME FUTURE MILITARY CONJUNCTION THERE.

3. AMB BROWN IS FREE TO DRAW ON THIS CABLE AS HE
WISHES IN HIS TALKS WITH JORDANIANS, IF HE FEELS IT WILL
HELP THEM MAKE UP THEIR MIND TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES
FROM SYRIA.
KEATING
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3678
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4494
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4277
USINT CAIRO 3531
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 2107
AMEMBASSY LONDON 3201
AMEMBASSY PARIS 0300
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4664

UNCLAS USUR 4257

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR UNSC RF

SURJ: ME II SC: AM SCALI RIGHT OF REPLY

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY AMB SCALI IN SC OCT 26:

QTE LET ME REAFFIRM ONCE AGAIN WHAT I HAVE SAID RE-
PEATEDLY HERE BEFORE. IN WORD AND DEED THE UNITED STATES
STANDS FOR STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE FIRE.

MR. PRESIDENT, IN THE VILW OF MY DELEGATION, THE FIRST
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION WE IN THIS CHAMBER COULD MAKE AT THIS
STAGE IS TO PROCEED SYSTEMATICALLY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE
MISSION OF ENDING THE FIGHTING AND BEGINNING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.
WE CANNOT ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING BY REPEATEDLY RESORTING IN THIS
CHAMBER TO EXCHANGES OF UNVERIFIABLE CHARGES AND COUNTERCHARGES
WHEN OBJECTIVE, UNCHALLENGEABLE FACTS ARE NEEDED. WE DO NOT NEED
MORE RECKLESS ACCUSATIONS. WE NEED RESPONSIBLE ACTION. WE CAN
PROCEED TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 340 WHICH HAS SPONSORED BY EIGHT
NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WHICH, IF CARRIED
OUT, CAN PUT US ON THE ROAD TO REAL PEACE.

I HAVE HEARD AMBASSADOR MALIK'S ONE-SIDED VERSION OF HISTORY
BEFORE AND I WILL NOT REPLY IN KIND BECAUSE OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS
HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO LEAD THE WAY TO PEACE AND THE
MOMENT IS TOO GRAVE FOR THAT KIND OF TALK.

I MUST TAKE EXCEPTION, HOWEVER, TO AMBASSADOR MALIK'S RESORT
TO THE HABIT OF SELECTING A PHRASE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S
PRESS CONFERENCE AND READING IT OUT OF CONTEXT. I SHOULD PERHAPS

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EXPRESS REGRET OVER SUCH A DEBATOR'S TRICK BUT I STEAD I WILL
THANK THE AREA SAGE FOR ADVERTISING DR. KISSINGER'S STATEMENTS.

I HAVE SENT A COMPLETE TEXT OF DR. KISSINGER'S ME'S
CONFERENCE REMARKS TO EACH OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS
IN NEW YORK BECAUSE I THOUGHT OBJECTIVE READERS WOULD BE
MORE IMPRESSED WITH THE SECRETARY'S FAIR MINDED DESCRIPTION
OF EVENTS AND AMERICAN POLICY AT THIS PERIOD OF HISTORY.
IF YOU HAVE HEARD AMBASSADOR CALIK'S SAMPLE TITILLATIONS,
DEAR COLLEAGUES, LET ME SUGGEST THAT YOU WILL FIND DR.
KISSINGER'S STATEMENTS TAKEN IN THEIR ENTIRETY EVEN MORE
INTERESTING AND FAR MORE BALANCED THAN SOME OF THE REMARKS
THAT YOU HAVE HEARD THIS EVENING. UNQUOTE.

SCALI
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